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Abstract : The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which stock market information can 
be used to estimate leading indicators of bank financial distress. This issue is of importance 
because of the increased emphasis on market forces by the Basel II committee (pillar 3). We 
specify a Logit early warning model, designed for European banks, which is used to test if 
market based indicators add predictive value to models relying on accounting data. Tests are 
also conducted to study the robustness of the link between market information and financial 
downgrading in the light of the too-big-too-fail (safety net) and the bank opacity (asymmetric 
information) hypotheses. Whereas some of our results support the use of market related 
indicators (in line with those previously obtained in the literature), we show that the accuracy 
of the predictive power is dependent on the extent to which bank liabilities are market traded. 
For banks which heavily rely on (insured) deposits, the market seems unable to convey useful 
information and the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks does not contribute to any 
improvement in the expected link.   
 
Key words: Bank, Market Discipline, Bank Risk, Market Prices 
JEL Classification : G21, G28 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Until the early 90’s early warning models of bank financial distress essentially relied 
on public information contained in financial statements (accounting data) and on 
macroeconomic variables. In recent years recommendations have aimed to enlarge the role of 
market forces to promote safe and sound banking systems as well as the use of market 
information by bank supervisors to improve the assessment of bank financial conditions 
(Berger, Davies and Flannery [2000], Flannery [1998, 2001]).  
This increased emphasis on market forces is at the heart of the new regulatory 
framework developed by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (Basel II Accord) 
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which includes market discipline as one of its three pillars (BIS [2003]). By imposing greater 
disclosure the aim is to improve the quality of the information provided by banks to investors; 
market forces are therefore assumed to reinforce bank capital regulation and supervision to 
ensure safety.  Under market discipline market prices and returns reflect the accurate level of 
individual bank risk because, unlike insured depositors, market investors will require a risk 
premium which may increase banks’ cost of funding and therefore reduce risk taking 
incentives. Consequently, it has been suggested that market prices could be used by 
supervisors as signals and also complement accounting data in the design of early warning 
systems.     
Under such an approach, as noted by Feldman and Levonian [2001], a major issue is 
whether the benefits from employing market information outweigh the costs and therefore 
ensure an efficient allocation of supervisory resources. Consequently, because the cost of 
using market information can be very high, a central question is whether market prices 
convey additional information which is not already included in accounting data (Curry, Elmer 
and Fissel [2002]).   
Recent papers studying US banks have investigated the predictive power of models in 
which market variables are added to standard call report financial data (Curry, Elmer and 
Fissel [2002, 2003], Evanoff and Wall [2001]). Their findings support the idea that market 
variables improve the assessment of bank financial health. In the European context, Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes [2005] focused on selected market indicators and their use as leading 
indicators of bank financial distress. Their results show that indicators derived from market 
prices are able to predict changes in bank financial health at a relatively long time horizon. 
They also insist on the additional contribution of market indicators relatively to an average 
indicator based on accounting data.  
The objective of this paper is two-fold: firstly, to construct an early warning system of 
bank financial distress specifically designed for European banks, and secondly to raise further 
issues, in the light of modern intermediation theory, ignored by the existing literature.  More 
precisely, we start by building an early warning model based on downgrades by three rating 
agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poors and Fitch) and a large set of accounting and market 
indicators. We then raise the issue of the additional contribution of market indicators based on 
stock prices and specifically as regards the information conveyed by market prices for 
banking institutions which are inherently opaque firms (asymmetric information). We also 
question the opportunity of relying on market information in the light of the too-big-to-fail 
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issue and the reliance on a safety net, that is the likelihood that a bank receives support from 
official or other sources (systemic risk).  
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the issue and relates it 
to the existing literature. Section 3 presents our methodology to estimate an early warning 
model and to test our different propositions. Section 4 defines our sample and shows how our 
leading indicators were constructed. Section 5 presents our empirical findings and section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Issue and related literature 
 
The issue of the reliance on market prices either to assess bank individual risk, the 
accuracy of market discipline in banking, or to specifically predict bank financial distress has 
been widely addressed in the literature (see Flannery [1998, 2001]). In a strand of this 
literature the prices of different types of securities issued by banks (shares, bonds, 
subordinated bonds, certificates of deposits…) have been used to study the link between 
market variables and bank risk. Building on the findings of these papers another issue focused 
on the potential for market prices to serve as early signals of bank failures or financial 
distress.   
Most of the existing literature focused on the prediction of large events such as actual 
bank closures or sharp downgrades by rating agencies or by official sources (supervisory 
ratings). Studying US banks, Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2003] showed that the prediction of a 
CAMEL (supervisory) rating downgrade to the lowest levels can be significantly improved by 
adding market variables to a set of accounting indicators.  However, this predictive power was 
found to be significant only for banks in the greatest financial distress. Similarly, Gunther, 
Levonian and Moore [2001] showed that the inclusion of a market indicator such as the 
expected default frequency (EDF) improves the predictive power of a model based on 
accounting ratios and CAMEL ratings.  
To our knowledge only one study was dedicated to the case of European banks (Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes [2005]). Based on a panel of 15 countries, their aim was to compare the 
properties of stock market and subordinated debt data as early indicators of Fitch/IBCA 
downgrades to C or below reflecting severe financial distress. They also showed that, beyond 
the information conveyed by a composite score variable based on accounting data, the equity 
market-based distance to default (KMV [2003]) significantly improves predictions up to an 18 
months time horizon.  
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This paper extends the earlier studies in several directions by proposing a framework 
which can be implemented for European banks and which enables to further raise two 
theoretical issues neglected in the existing literature.  
Firstly, based on a broad panel of European banks our approach combines different 
frequency data (annual for accounting data and daily for market data) without imposing 
underlying restrictive assumptions implicit to some of the existing empirical models which 
are discussed in the next section.  
Secondly, we focus on the predictive power of a large number of market indicators 
estimated solely from stock prices. Because European markets for other securities issued by 
banks (such as bonds or subordinated bonds) generally suffer from insufficient liquidity 
(inactive trading) our analysis is restricted to equityholders incentives and uses, in contrast to 
earlier studies, a greater variety of market indicators.  
Thirdly, instead of focusing on bank failures or on severe financial distress we consider 
the prediction of any downward change in a bank’s financial health. In this sense our view is 
that early detection of downgrades may play a major role in the implementation of prompt 
corrective action by regulators without jeopardizing strategic orientations followed by bank 
managers. In this sense we deal with the issue of identifying banks’ future financial health 
deterioration by considering the information contained in the changes in indicators (financial 
ratios and/or market variables) rather than in their level as in previous studies. 
Fourthly, our objective is also to test the robustness of results in the light of modern 
financial intermediation theory developed in the steps of Leland and Pyle [1977], Diamond 
and Dybvig [1983] and Diamond [1984]. Banks and financial intermediaries are considered as 
agents that play a major role in the financial system as information intermediaries. They 
collect and process information namely about loan customers (Diamond 1984, 1991) which 
implies that they possess private information. As such, market participants (outsiders) should 
have limited ability to monitor banks and market discipline in the banking industry should not 
play a prominent role. Therefore, due to the inherent opacity of banks (opacity effect) and the 
need to support large banking institutions (too-big-to-fail effect) we question the ability of 
market indicators to accurately predict future financial distress for different types of banks 
and financial institutions.    
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3. Methodology 
 
As a first step, we implement a procedure to test for the specific and additional 
contribution of various market indicators to the prediction of bank financial distress. We then 
study the stability of the predictive power of early warning market indicators with respect to 
bank size and balance sheet structure. 
3.1. Identifying the additional contribution of market indicators  
Assessing  the ability of market indicators to predict bank financial distress requires 
the choice of an event capturing the changing status of each bank. In the absence of actual 
bankruptcies in the European banking industry in sufficient number, we identify changes in a 
bank’s financial condition through downgrading announcements by three rating agencies 
(Fitch, Standard & Poors, and Moody’s). Most studies on US banks considered either explicit 
bank failures or supervisory ratings (Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2003], Gunther, Levonian and 
Moore [2004]).  Because of the lack of access to explicit supervisory ratings in Europe which 
are confidential in most countries, we rely on public information disclosed by private 
agencies.  In this sense the selection of our events is close to the method developed by Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes [2005] who use downgrades of Fitch individual ratings to C or below as a 
proxy of bank failure. In contrast to their study, and because we are more concerned by the 
actual information content of stock prices than their ability to forecast failures, we consider 
that any downgrading announcement should be retained in our study. This implies that a 
deterioration in a bank’s financial health is captured in our study by a downgrading from any 
initial level and down to any level below. Identifying both narrow and broad changes is 
essential for the robustness of results and provides a more general framework for early 
warning models estimation. Also, accounting for downgrades by more than just one rating 
agency ensures that, in our specification, the event date is the earliest possible with respect to 
announcements by one of the three major agencies covering financial institutions in Europe.  
We then define two sets of variables : accounting indicators and equity market based 
indicators likely to predict a future downgrade in a bank’s financial condition. When 
assessing the link between the dependent variable and early warning indicators several 
shortcomings need to be tackled. Firstly, the different variables are not available at the same 
frequencies (daily for market indicators, yearly for accounting indicators). Whereas some 
studies proceed by linear or more advanced interpolation of low frequency data (i.e. Gropp 
and alii [2005]) we consider that such a procedure is not convenient because it implies that in 
some cases future information may be used to explain current downgrades. Therefore instead 
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of departing from each event (downgrade by a rating agency) to then compute all the relevant 
accounting and market indicators on a backward given time horizon we deal with the issue of 
predictability departing from each date at which accounting data information is available. In 
the case of European banks this date is 31 December of each year. We then consider events 
taking place in the four subsequent quarters following this date.  
Formally, consider that for each of the N banks of the sample, there are T observations 
through time for accounting indicators. These dates are retained as the starting point for the 
prediction implementation. To ensure that our empirical implementation relies on clean and 
robust events we then impose that, for a bank (b), a starting point (t) and a (K) horizon 
forecast (K = 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters ahead), the value taken by the dependant binary variable Y 
is equal to : 
 . 1 if downgrading occurs for this bank (b) within [t, t + K] with no upgrading taking 
place during the whole calendar year to avoid noise around the event date. When several 
downgrades are announced by a given rating agency or by any of the three rating agencies 
only the first date is taken into account. In addition, because our setting is based on calendar 
years and quarters we need to check that a downgrade occurring in the last quarter of a given 
year is not followed by a downgrade by another rating agency in the first quarter of the 
following year (for example, a downgrade in December followed by a downgrade in January 
which is actually the same event). In such cases, again, only the first date is taken into 
account).  
. 0 if  the rating remains unaltered throughout the end of the calendar year; 
 . in any other case, Y is considered as "non available" NA
1
. 
The following figure illustrates the definition of the dependant variable (0, 1, NA)  for 
a 3 quarters horizon forecast :  
TIME 
RATING 
t1  
Begining of the year 
t1 +1 t1 +2 t1 +3 t2 
End of the year 
Accounting year 
3 quarters ahead forecasting 
Y = 1 
rating  
Accounting and market data 
considered up to this date 
TIME 
RATING 
t1  
Beginning of the year
t1 +1 t1 +2 t1 +3 t2 
End of the year 
Accounting year 
3 quarters ahead forecasting 
Y = "NA" 
rating 
Accounting and market data 
considered up to this date 
 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, our setting could also account for upgrades. Because our aim is to focus on financial 
deterioration by using rating changes as proxies, we ignored upgrades. Consequently, in our setting, the 
prediction of  downgrades (Y = 1) is more stringent because the significance of explanatoy variables  is a priori 
more difficult to establish. 
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TIME 
RATING 
t1  
Beginning of the year 
t1 +1 t1 +2 t1 +3 t2 
End of the year 
Accounting year 
3 quarters ahead forecasting 
Y = "NA" 
rating 
Accounting and market data 
considered up to this date 
   
TIME 
RATING 
t1  
Beginning of the year 
t1 +1 t1 +2 t1 +3 t2 
End of the year 
Accounting year 
3 quarters ahead forecasting 
Y = 0 
rating 
Accounting and market data 
considered up to this date 
 
 
 
By defining the dependant variable as such we prevent the same values taken by 
accounting or market indicators from being related with different rating changes occurred for 
a given bank. For a given prediction horizon (1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters), there are, theoretically, N  T observations Yi for the explained binary variable where i refers to a  bank (b), a  starting 
prediction point (t) and a  forecasting horizon (K):  
i = i(b, t, K) 
Accounting Cji(b, t, K) and market Mli(b, t, K) indicators are computed at a starting point 
(t), that is on December 31
th
 of each year. Consequently, the interpolation of the missing 
accounting data as implemented by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] to estimate their 
distance to default indicator is suitably avoided ensuring that the information content of 
accounting data based indicators is not inappropriately upward biased (prediction at time t0 
based on data obtained by interpolation of past but also future data regarding financial 
condition at time t1> t0). Formally, this means that the estimation of early indicators 
incorporating accounting data or both accounting and market data (such as the distance to 
default) is not performed using information on the state of the world subsequent to the 
prediction date.  
To assess the relationship between market and accounting early warning indicators 
and rating downgrades we use a logit model at four time period horizons to estimate the 
probability of a downgrade : 
Prob{Yi = 1} = ( + 
1 1  J Lj ji l lij lC M  ) 
where Cji and Mli stand for the j
th
 accounting indicator and the l
th
 market indicator 
respectively and (.) denotes the cumulated logistic distribution function. Maximum 
likelihood estimators of the coefficients (, j, l) are used and robust Huber-White 
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covariance matrix estimation allows for possible misspecification of the error term 
distribution. 
For each prediction horizon (models 1 to 4), the most powerful predictors of financial 
deterioration are selected in the following manner. As a first step, we investigate the 
predictive power of the sole accounting indicators regardless of market information. The most 
performing indicators are selected via a stepwise process
2
.  
 Such a procedure identifies the sub-set of accounting indicators that optimally predict 
financial weakening. As a second step, we assess the marginal contribution of market 
indicators by extending the filtering process (stepwise) to a large set of market indicators by 
adding the latter to the optimal sub-set of accounting indicators obtained in the first step
3
. 
 
3.2.  Predicting downgrades : too-big-to-fail and opacity effects 
We then test for the stability of the above relationship by allowing for possible size 
effects or bank opacity effects. We control for such effects by conducting several tests. 
Firstly, dummy variables are constructed capturing too-big-to-fail banks or banks likely to 
benefit from either a public or private support (safety net). Such variables are also defined on 
the basis of a set of standard financial ratios which are generally used as opacity proxies in the 
literature.  Dummies are then introduced in the different models (models 1 to 4) to conduct a 
series of stability tests. Secondly, tests are also carried out by estimating the different models 
on restricted samples of banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 As a common rule of thumb, we retained a 5 % level for type 1 error ; a Max (Min) LR statistic was used as a 
criterion for adding (ruling out) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set.  
3 As noted by an anonymous referee, because financial market data arrive more frequently than accounting data 
(higher frequency) a possible extension of our work is to include, for each horizon, market indicators computed 
on the basis of current information (for example, for the one year horizon, consider price changes up to the 
fourth quarter). However, our aim here is mainly to study the length of the predictive time horizon (1, 2, 3 or 4 
quarters) allowing supervisors to implement prompt corrective action well ahead (prior to failure) and to test if 
the accuracy of the predictive power depends on bank opacity and the liability structure of banks. Naturally, we 
should expect that stock market based indicators perform better (higher marginal contribution) when we move 
closer towards the event date (downgrade). 
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4. Sample and indicators 
 
4.1. Sample 
   
Table 1 : distribution of banks by country and specialisation  
 
 
Country Numbers
Germany 7
Denmark 1
Spain 5
France 8
Greece 2
Ireland 1
Italy 15
Luxemburg 1
Norway 2
The Netherlands 4
Portugal 4
United Kingdom 11
Sweden 1
Switzerland 2    
Specialisation Numbers
commercial bank 31
cooperative bank 7
medium and long term credit bank 2
real estate and mortgage bank 6
savings bank 2
investment bank 3
bank holding and holding coimpany 9
non banking credit institution 4  
 
 
The sample consists of events (downgrades or absence of downgrades) related to 64 
European banks regularly listed on the stock market and for which ratings from at least one of 
the three major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's or Standard and Poors) are available during 
the 1995-2002 period. Table 1 presents the distribution of these banks by country and 
specialisation. 
Daily market data (bank stock prices) are taken from Datastream International and 
annual income statements and balance sheets come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. Our sample 
of banks is restricted to EU banks for which market data is reliable for the purpose of our 
study. Only actively and regularly traded stocks were considered. Table 2 shows descriptive 
statistics on our sample of banks which exhibits a relatively high level of heterogeneity. This 
enables us to investigate further on the robustness of the relationship between early indicators 
and the probability of financial deterioration with respect to differences in size or balance 
sheet structure.   
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Table 2 : The sample of banks : summary accounting statistics from 31/12/1995 to 
31/12/2001 
 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
TOTAL ASSETS in million of euros 118343.42 191634.00 1407.13 922793.50 
NET LOANS/ TOTAL ASSETS 53.75 18.75 4.60 86.85  
DEPOSITS/ TOTAL ASSETS  62.23 21.14 0.00  92.67  
SUBORDINATED DEBT/ TOTAL ASSETS  1.50  0.88 0.00  3.59  
DEPOSITS in million of euros 72338.04 107114.57 437.81 412237.10 
SUBORDINATED DEBT in million of euros 2031.45 3091.04 0 10309.50 
TIER 1 RATIO 7.95 2.02 4.44  13.27 
ROA  0.82 0.67 -0.08  3.72 
 Ratios are in percentage. Net loans are gross loans – loan loss reserves. Each mean is calculated as 
T N1
X X
jtNT t 1 j 1
   with N the number of banks and T the number of financial reports. The standard deviations are 
calculated on a similar basis. 
 
 
4.2. Financial deterioration indicator 
 
Table 3 provides information about Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors' ratings. 
These ratings are employed to build the binary dependent variable previously defined. 
Because the method used to construct the dependent variable implies several restrictions 
(discussed in the previous section) only a limited number of downgrades are taken into 
account. As a whole, because only the first date is used to construct the binary variable Y 
when a bank is subsequently downgraded by different rating agencies, our final (clean) set is 
limited to  62 downgrades (28 by Standard and Poors, 22 by Fitch and 12 by Moody’s) 
distributed as follows : 15 for the first quarters, 14 for the second quarters, 9 for the third 
quarters and 24 for the fourth quarters. While the proportion of S&P downgrades is initially 
relatively high, because we considered all types of downgrades by each rating agency, our 
final clean sample is reasonably balanced.  
 
Table 3 : Distribution of downgrades  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 252  (62) 
downgrades 5 (3) 12 (4) 14 (7) 21 (5) 27 (5) 61 (12) 112 (24) 
117 (26) 
downgrades by 
Standard and Poors 
1 (1) 2 (1) 3 (2) 11 (5) 11 (1) 28 (6) 61 (10) 
67(22) downgrades 
by Fitch 4 (2) 1 (1) 7 (3) 5 (2) 10 (2) 17 (4) 23 (8) 
68 (14) 
downgrades by 
Moody's 0 (0) 9 (2) 4 (2) 5 (0) 6 (2) 16 (2) 28 (6) 
Numbers of clean downgrades are shown in parentheses.  Sources : Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
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4.3. Accounting indicators 
 
As mentioned previously, we define several accounting indicators Ci(b,t) that are likely 
to predict bank financial deterioration. Table 4 defines the set of ratios Ri(b,t) which we employ 
and which are commonly used in the literature to assess banks’ financial condition. These 
ratios Ri can be distributed into four categories corresponding to the CAEL rating : Capital, 
Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity. Several ratios are defined for each category. 
Accounting ratios can be introduced in such prediction models either in level or in 
variation (first order difference). Most of the previous studies considered these ratios in level 
(Gunther, Levonian and Moore [2001], Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2002]) which can be justified 
when it comes to predict an event like a failure. However, if the aim is rather to predict a 
change in financial health it seems more appropriate to introduce not the values taken by the 
ratios, but their time changes. Besides, in this study, all banks are treated equally regardless of 
their initial financial strength. This means that the downgrade of a sound and safe bank (as 
might be reflected by the level of financial ratios) can only be captured by changes in the 
values of ratios. Also, because our sample consists of banks with a broad range of ratings, 
considering the values taken by financial indicators would be inappropriate. Therefore we 
define Cji(b, t), the change in the value of the accounting ratio Rji as : Cji(b,t) = Rji(b,t) = Rji(b, t) -
Rji(b,t-1). Accounting indicators used in this study are these changes further denoted by Cji(b,t). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
Table 4 : Accounting ratios Rj 
Category Name Definitions 
Capital 
TIER Tier 1 capital/ risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks 
CAPITAL (Tier1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks 
KPA Equity/ Total assets 
KPCN Equity / (gross loans – loan loss reserves) 
KPD Equity / Customer and short term funding 
KPL Equity / Liabilities 
FPA Capital funds/ Total assets 4 
FPCN Capital funds / (gross loans – loan loss reserves) 
FPD Capital funds / Customer and short term funding 
FPL Capital funds / Liabilities 
Asset quality 
PROVCB Loan loss reserves/ Gross loans 
DOTREV Loan loss provisions/ Net interest revenue 
PROVA Loan loss reserves / Total assets 
DOTA Loan loss provisions / Total assets 
DOTCB Loan loss provisions / Gross loans 
INDIC Risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks (inferred from the Cooke 
ratio)/ Total assets 5 
Earnings 
INTAP  Net interest revenue/Average earning assets 
INTAM Net interest revenue/ Total assets 
ROA Return on assets = Net Income/Total assets 
ROE Return on equity = Net Income/Equity 
Liquidity 
INTERB Interbank assets/ Interbank liabilities 
CBDEPST Gross loans/ Customer and short term funding 
ALD Liquid assets/ Customer and short term funding 
ALREF Liquid assets / Total deposits and borrowings 
                                                 
4 Capital funds are defined as : Equity + Hybrid Capital + Subordinated Debt. 
5 See Goyeau, Sauviat, Tarazi (1998). 
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Table 5 : Market indicators 
Indicators 
Definition Expected sign of the 
coefficient 
LNP  Difference between the natural logarithm of market price and its moving average calculated on 261 days. Negative 
 RCUM 
Cumulative return :  65 , 1
1
1 1
bt b t k
k
RCUM r  
         with rb,t+1 = , 1 , ,( /)b t b t b tP P P   where rbt is the daily return of the stock b; this cumulative return is 
calculated on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event, Pbt is the daily stock price of bank b. 
Negative 
 RCUM_NEG 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the cumulative return is negative in the two last quarters of the accounting period (financial year) 
preceding the event and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
EXCRCUM 
Cumulative market excess return :    65 65, , 1 , 1
1 1
1 1 1 1    
                                 b t b t k m t kk kEXCRCUM r r  
with rm the daily market return calculated from the country specific market index extracted from Datastream International for the fourth 
quarter of the financial exercise preceding the event. 
Negative 
EXCRCUM_NEG
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the cumulative market excess return is negative in the two last quarters of the accounting period (financial 
year) preceding the event and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
 RAC 
Cumulative abnormal returns on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event: 
RACbt= 
65
, 1
1
b t k
k
RA    with RAbt=Rbt-( ˆˆ mtR  ) , the market model is estimated on the third quarter of the accounting period (financial 
year) preceding the event   
Negative 
 ECTYP Change in the standard deviation of daily returns between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) 
preceding the event 
Positive 
 BETA Change in the market model beta ( ˆˆˆ mtbt RR   ) between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) 
preceding the event 
Positive 
 RISKSPEC Change in specific risk : standard deviation of the market model residual between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period 
(financial year) preceding the event. 
Positive 
 Z Change in the Z-score between the third and fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event with : 
Z=  1 /b rr    where br is the mean return of stock b on the preceding quarter and r  the standard deviation of the return.  Negative 
 DD Annual change in the distance to default estimated at the end of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. The distance to default is inferred from the market value of a risky debt (Merton (1977)) based on the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing 
formula. Details on the estimation method and on the data are presented in appendix.  
Negative 
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4.4. Market indicators 
We can reasonably assume that the equity market conveys useful information to 
predict financial deterioration. If the market is efficient, prices and returns should incorporate 
the risk exposure of banks and thus their default risk. Table 5 presents the market based 
indicators used in this study which are constructed from daily equity prices. In contrast with 
previous literature we cover a broad range of indicators to compare their relative predictive 
power. The variables LNP, RCUM, EXCRCUM, RCUM_NEG, EXCRCUM_NEG, RAC  are 
used to capture the effects of shocks or the presence of abnormal returns.  The variables ECTYP, BETA and  RISKSPEC are employed to detect risk changes and Z and DD 
changes in the probability of failure. Some of the variables used in this study have already 
been introduced in similar models of bank distress to test the additional predictive 
contribution of stock market prices. Market excess return (EXCRCUM) and durably negative 
market excess return (EXCRCUM_NEG) were introduced by Elmer and Fissel [2001]. 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] used the value taken by the distance to default variable. In 
this study, several market indicators are introduced in difference in the predictive equation 
(variables reflecting market assessment of risk or the probability of failure). 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
As a preliminary stage we consider the predictive power of each indicator by running 
logistic regressions in which each explanatory variable is introduced separately. We then 
present the best performing accounting based models for the different prediction horizons. 
The additional contribution of market indicators is then assessed by augmenting each model 
with market indicators which are selected by the stepwise procedure. Eventually, tests are 
conducted to study the robustness of the predictive power of market indicators with respect to 
bank size (too-big-to-fail effect) and  bank balance sheet structure (opacity effect).  
 
5.1. Individual contribution of indicators  
Table 6 shows the results obtained for each horizon (models 1 to 4), when each early 
indicator is separately introduced in the model. Results are only reported when coefficients 
are at least significant at the 10% level. The last column of table 6 (model 5) shows the results 
that are obtained when the dependent binary variable Y is based on sharp downgrades 
reflecting severe financial distress (failure or quasi-failure). 
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Table 6 : Financial deterioration and early indicators : simple regressions 
Model specification : Prob{Yi = 1} = ( +  Xi) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Capital  
ΔKPCN 0.143** 
(1.999) 
    
ΔKPD -0.175* 
(-1.812) 
   
-0.139* 
(-1.853) 
ΔCAPITAL -0.271* 
(-1.657) 
   
0.263** 
(2.274) 
Asset quality  
ΔDOTREV  0.019* 
(1.698) 
0.018* 
(1.679) 
  
ΔDOTCB  0.902** 
(1.927) 
0.998** 
(2.202) 
0.766** 
(1.990) 
 
Earnings 
 
ΔINTAM -1.673** 
(-2.015) 
    
ΔINTAP -1.747*** 
(-2.605) 
    
ΔROA    -0.642** 
(-1.981) 
-0.655* 
(-1.961) 
ΔROE  -0.065** 
(-2.310) 
-0.056** 
(-2.191) 
-0.050** 
(-2.244) 
 
Liquidity ΔALREF -0.078** 
(-2.228) 
    
 
Market 
indicators 
EXCRCUM  
-3.060** 
(-2.217) 
-2.378** 
(-1.965) 
-2.464** 
(-2.502) 
-5.648*** 
(-3.603) 
EXCRCUM_
NEG 
    
0.963* 
(1.835) 
LNP 
-3.229** 
(-2.088) 
-3.180** 
(-2.537) 
-3.502*** 
(-2.855) 
-3.819*** 
(-3.451) 
-6.165*** 
(-2.818) 
RAC     
-2.406* 
(-1.922) 
RCUM  
-2.914* 
(-1.739) 
-2.396* 
(-1.672) 
-2.953** 
(-2.485) 
-7.966*** 
(-4.511) 
RCUM_NEG 
1.407** 
(2.524) 
1.225*** 
(2.883) 
1.001*** 
(2.498) 
1.012*** 
(2.946) 
1.738*** 
(3.271) 
 
This table reports simple logit estimation results : for each model, the dependent variable is separately 
regressed on each explanatory variable and a constant. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings (whatever 
their extent) occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Model 5 explains only downgradings 
occurring in less than 4 quarters and reflecting quasi-insolvency. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-
White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown 
in parenthesis. 
 
 
On the whole, the coefficients associated to changes in profitability ratios (ROA and ROE) or to loan loss provisions (DOTCB) are significant only for the longer horizons (2, 3 
and 4 quarters). Inversely changes in capital ratios (KPCN, KPD and CAPITAL) perform 
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significantly only for the shortest horizon (1 quarter). These results suggest that income 
statement information (flows) allows earlier prediction of financial downgrades whereas 
balance sheet information (stocks) which is by definition less flexible might only be useful for 
relatively shorter horizons. The negative (expected sign) and significant contribution of the 
change in the liquidity ratio (ALREF) for the shortest horizon solely suggests that 
downgrades are shortly preceded by a partial liquidation of liquid assets. However, similarly 
to balance sheet information this signal can only be employed at a short horizon. On the 
whole, these preliminary results favour indicators which combine information contained in 
both balance sheets and income statements for longer horizons predictions.  
The results obtained in table 6 for market indicators show that for every time horizon a 
number of market based variables significantly predict financial deterioration (downgrades). 
In each logistic regression (for every prediction horizon) the coefficients of the variables 
capturing downward or upward trends in stock prices or negative cumulative returns (LNP  
and RCUM_NEG) are highly significant with the expected sign. Cumulative returns (RCUM) 
and cumulative excess returns (EXCRCUM) are significant for three out of four horizons.  
These preliminary results suggest that market based indicators may well contribute to predict 
financial difficulties at a relatively long time horizon.   
To check for the robustness of these different results, with regards to our sample, 
regressions (see Table A1 in appendix) were also ran by retaining for each quarter only the 
downgrades which occurred within the considered quarter.  This experiment, which restricts 
the number of observations, lead to similar results. The results obtained in models 1 to 4 are 
also compared to those that are obtained when early indicators are used to predict severe 
financial difficulties (model 5 in table 6). In model 5 the dependant variable is constructed 
using downgrades in the Fitch Individual rating to C or below as in  Gropp, Vesala and 
Vulpes [2005]
6
 as well as downgrades in Moody’s financial strength ratings to similar levels 
(our sample contains 17 “clean” (Y=1) downgrades of this type).  These ratings aim to assess 
the financial strength of an institution by explicitly removing the safety net, that is the 
likelihood of being supported by a parent bank or by public authorities.  The obtained results 
clearly show that among our relatively large set of accounting and market indicators, variables 
which could be retained to predict downgrades of any level (weak or strong deterioration in 
                                                 
6 According to Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] a downgrade in Fitch Individual rating to C or below is 
generally followed within one year’s time by a government or parent bank intervention.  
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financial strength) are also significant to predict sharp downgrades (failure or quasi-failure). 
Namely, there is no significant market based variable present in model 5 (prediction of 
failures) which is absent from equations 1 to 4 (prediction of either severe or moderate 
financial deterioration).  
 
5.2. Contribution of accounting indicators  
 
 
Table 7 :  Financial deterioration and accounting indicators 
Model specification : Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J j ji
j 1
C   ) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant  
-2.723***
(-8.297) 
-1.919***
(-8.630) 
-1.612*** 
(-8.364) 
-1.099*** 
(-7.059) 
Earnings ratios 
INTAP -1.717** 
(-2.537) 
   
ROE  -0.084***
(-2.990) 
-0.072*** 
(-2.743) 
-0.061*** 
(-2.731) 
Mc Fadden R2 
Total number of observations 
 
0.049 0.045 0.032 0.024 
187 204 213 237 
Number of observations with  
Y=1 
 15 29 38 62 
 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant and the 
accounting indicators selected by the stepwise process. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  
respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, 
** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each 
year and each indicator. 
 
 
In line with the method discussed in section 3, we identify for each predictive horizon 
the most powerful subset of accounting indicators (stepwise procedure) in explaining the 
probability of a future downgrade. The results (table 7) show that for every horizon 
accounting data information is conveyed by one or two indicators. To deal with collinearity 
we also conducted the stepwise procedure by considering in the set of accounting indicators 
variables which were not correlated. Both procedures lead to the same optimal subset of 
variables for every time horizon. Not surprisingly, we obtain results which are in line with 
those previously obtained. Indicators which better contribute to explain future rating 
downgrades combine information contained in both income statements and balance sheets : 
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the change in the return on equity (ROE) for horizons ranging from 2 to 4 terms and the 
change in the implicit interest margin variable (INTAP) for the shortest horizon.  
 
5.3. Additional contribution of market indicators 
To assess the specific additional contribution of market indicators, each accounting 
information based model obtained in table 7 is augmented with market indicators. Table 8 
shows the estimation results which contain only the market indicators that “survived” to the 
stepwise selection procedure when added to the optimal subset of accounting indicators.   In 
this sense this procedure is based on the assumption that market information is not only a 
substitute to accounting information but also conveys additional information which 
contributes to improve the prediction of future downgrades.   
The results in table 8 show that, all the coefficients have the expected sign and that 
among our large set of potential market indicators the LNP variable significantly improves 
predictions in the 4 models. Moreover, the degree of significance of this market indicator 
increases with the prediction horizon which suggests that this variable is more efficient in 
predicting events four quarters ahead 
7
.  A possible explanation is that market indicators react 
well ahead prior to a downgrade (4 quarters) and consequently the market is less likely to 
react heavily just before the actual “punishment” date (1 quarter). Up to this stage our results 
are thus in line with those obtained in previous research. Moreover, our stepwise procedure 
lead to the selection of the simplest and less costly indicator. Particularly, the distance-to-
default variable adds less information than a variable simply capturing significant changes in 
stock prices. Our findings are thus similar to the results obtained by Elmer and Fissel [2001], 
and Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2003] in the case of US banks who limit their investigation to 
price trends or excess return indicators. Our results do not support the use of a distance-to-
default indicator as a leading indicator as shown by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] for 
European banks
8
.  
                                                 
7 Because we consider overlapping windows, the coefficient associated to LNP in  model 1 can be interpreted as 
its ability to predict an event occurring at a mean horizon of 1.5 months (assuming  that downgrades occur on 
February 15th). For model 2 this mean horizon can be be proxied by : (15 * 1.5 + 14 * 4.5) / 29 = 2.9 months ( 15 
and 14 are the number of events occurring respectively on the first and second quarters). For models 3 and 4 the 
mean horizons are 4.02 and 6.53 months respectively. 
8 Because our setting accounts for downgrades by more than one rating agency this raises the issue of whether 
the stock market delivers a weaker signal when there is disagreement among agencies or whether the intensity of 
the market indicator signal is higher when all rating agencies agree on the opportunity of a downgrade. We 
address this question by  defining a dummy variable CONSENSUS which takes the value of 1 if, at least, one of 
the two other rating agencies downgrades the same bank during the four months following the first sanction and 
0 in any other case. Each model estimated in table 8 is then augmented with the interacting variable LNP * 
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Table 8 :  Financial deterioration :  
Specific and additional contribution of market indicators 
Model specification: Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J Lj ji l li
j 1 l 1
C M       ) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
-2.823***
(-8.337) 
-1.932 ***
(-8.383) 
-1.638***
(-8.191) 
-1.136*** 
(-6.955) 
Earnings ratios 
INTAP -1.925***
(-2.924)     ROE 
 
-0.072** 
(-2.193) 
-0.057* 
(-1.820) 
-0.042* 
(-1.697)  
Market indicators 
LNP -4.057** 
(-2.440) 
-3.700***
(-2.732) 
-4.185***
(-3.267) 
-4.347*** 
(-3.931)  
Mc Fadden R2 0.110 0.090 0.088 0.090 
Number of observations 187 204 213 237 
Number of cases  Y=1 15 29 38 62 2 statistic for l = 0 5.952** 7.467*** 10.672*** 15.452*** 
 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the 
accounting indicators previously selected and the market indicators selected by the stepwise process. Models 1, 
2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because 
all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator. χ2 statistic refers to a likelihood ratio test 
for the null hypothesis of nullity of market indicator coefficients.  
 
 
5.4. Size effect, opacity effect and the actual contribution of market based indicators  
As discussed earlier in the paper, the contribution of market indicators to early detection 
of bank financial distress is a challenge to modern banking theory because theory assumes 
that banks acquire private information on borrowers which may be ignored by outsiders. 
Banking theory also insists on negative external effects induced by liquidity services offered 
by banks supporting the existence of public safety nets in practice for at least the largest 
banking institutions. In this sense the market may less react to changes in financial conditions 
for large institutions implying a lower contribution of market prices to predict future failure. 
Conversely, one could assume that the market mainly focuses on the largest institutions 
because information may be less reliable for smaller banks. Identically, bank opacity may also 
                                                                                                                                                        
CONSENSUS,  in order to test for the null of the absence of  higher predictive power of the market indicator in 
such a context. The results (see table A2 in appendix) show that the null is never rejected. 
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affect the marginal contribution of market indicators. In the banking literature, private 
information is often captured by assessing the structure of financial statements. In theory, 
opacity comes from the intermediation function of banks and is often proxied by the ratio of 
loans to total assets. Since deposits are insured and deposit interest rates are not marked to 
market alternatively the ratio of deposits to total assets is also another frequently employed 
proxy. Conversely, large issues of non insured securities such as bonds or subordinated bonds 
(market funded liabilities) should induce market discipline hence contributing to improve the 
quality of the information conveyed by the market. Because liquidity is essential for market 
signals to transmit accurate information, the extent to which liabilities are market funded is 
crucial. Therefore the proportion of market funding on the liability side of the balance sheet is 
also considered as a determinant variable in several studies.  
The size effect and the opacity effect are assessed by first estimating for each horizon 
an augmented model specified as follows :  
Prob{Yi = 1} = (' Di + 
1 1  J Lj ji l lij lC M  + 1 'L l i lil D M ) 
where Di is a dummy variable, capturing either the size effect (DBIGi) or the opacity effect 
(DOPACi). Two tests are then conducted first to determine the effectiveness of each effect  
(H0 : ' = 0 and ’l = 0  l)  and then to assess the assumption that size or opacity outweighs 
or neutralizes the predictive power of each market indicator (H0 : l + ’l = 0  l). 
 
5.4.1 Size effect 
 Tables 9 shows the results obtained for the size effect. DBIG is a binary variable 
which equals 1 if total bank assets are higher than 300 billion euros (a significant threshold in 
our sample asset size distribution) or if the considered bank is the first or second largest bank 
in its country ranking ; otherwise it equals 0.  On the basis of the first criterion  (asset size) we 
checked that every bank with a total asset value above 300 billion euros was assigned a Fitch 
Support rating equal to 1. This support rating indicates the likelihood of public or private 
support on a scale from 1 to 4; a grade of 1 (the highest) indicates the presence of an assured 
legal guarantee. The second criterion (country ranking) was introduced because banks which 
may be considered as relatively small in our sample may benefit from a major position in their 
domestic banking system. An alternative way to construct the binary variable is to solely 
consider the Fitch Support rating (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] used ratings 1 and 2 to 
identify too-big-to-fail banks but in a different setting). However, this rating was not reported 
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for all the banks in our sample throughout the studied period 
9
. Also, the use of a continuous 
variable such as the log of total assets, which is common in the empirical literature, is 
irrelevant in the case of our cross European analysis because it would not render country 
specific characteristics (size difference of the largest banks in each banking system, 
institutional arrangements…). 
 
Table 9 :  Contribution of market indicators and bank size 
Model specification : Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J L Li j ji l li l i li
j 1 l 1 l 1
' DBIG C M ' (DBIG M             ) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -3.410*** 
(-7.091) 
-2.275*** 
(-7.833) 
-1.876*** 
(-7.669) 
-1.216*** 
(-6.479)  
DBIG 1.098 
(1.480)
1.019** 
(2.281) 
0.759* 
(1.850) 
0.260 
(0.698)  INTAP -2.518*** 
(-3.435)     ROE
 
-0.068* 
(-1.932) 
-0.055* 
(-1.722) 
-0.042* 
(-1.690)  
LNP -1.493 
(-1.069) 
-2.851 
(-1.541) 
-3.303** 
(-2.060) 
-3.413*** 
(-2.686)  
LNP  DBIG -7.870 ** 
(-2.332) 
-2.174 
(-0.790) 
-2.456 
(-0.927) 
-3.336 
(-1.376)  
Mc Fadden R2 0.211 0.130 0.114 0.101 
Total number of observations 187 204 213 237 
Number  of observations of type Y=1 15 29 38 62 
Risk level to reject  : α'= 0 et γl'=0 l 0.08 %*** 1.54 %** 7.92 %* 22.04 % 
Risk level to reject : γl + γl' =0  l 0.27 %*** 1.42 %** 0.63 %*** 0.11%*** 
 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the 
accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Size effect is taken into account with a 
dummy variable (DBIG) associated with the constant and the market indicators. DBIG is equal to 1 if bank's 
total assets is greater than 300 billions of euros or if the bank is ranked first or second in its country, and 0 
otherwise. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. 
Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different 
models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator.  
 
 
The results show that for relatively smaller banks LNP is no longer significant for the 
shortest horizons (model 1 and model 2).  The tests  (two last  rows of table 9) show that  the 
size effect  decreases with the horizon length and  that the size effect  increases the predictive 
power of LNP on the shortest horizon.  We checked for the robustness of these results by 
running our stepwise method separately on our two samples of small and large banks. The 
results, which are not presented here, but available upon request, showed that all our market 
                                                 
9 Based on  Fitch Support ratings displayed in Bankscope at the end of 2002, our two criteria enable us to capture 
all the banks with a  Support rating = 1 and 10 out of  the 17 banks with a  Support rating = 2. 
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indicators were rejected (no  significant additional prediction value) for the sample of small 
banks in model 1 whereas LNP was highly significant in improving the prediction of future 
downgrades for the sample of large banks, for every horizon.  On the whole, whereas Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes [2005] show that safety net issues do not alter the predictive power of 
market indicators, suggesting that stockholders do not expect to be rescued along with 
debtholders in case of default, our results are more mitigated.  Instead of underlining the lack 
of reaction (or the less significant reaction) of large banks’ stock prices (too-big-to fail effect) 
we present evidence, for the two first horizons, that a decrease in asset size may undermine 
the ability of stock prices to transmit useful information on future bank financial health.  
 
5.4.2 Opacity effect 
 Several definitions of the binary variable DOPAC were considered to study the link 
between the degree of bank opacity and the predictive power of market variables. We 
considered the ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets, the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets, the 
ratio of Subordinated Debt to Total Assets, and the ratio of Market Funded Liabilities to Total 
Assets
10
. Only the results obtained with the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets and the ratio of 
Market Funded Liabilities to Total Assets are conclusive in discriminating the predictive 
power of market variables in a very similar way. Therefore we solely report in table 10 the 
results obtained when DOPAC equals 1 if  the ratio of market funded liabilities is lower than 
its median (equal to 25.63%)
11
. Market funded liabilities are measured as : Total Assets – 
Deposits – Total Equity. 
The results in table 10 show that the significance of both LNP and LNPxDOPAC increases 
with the prediction horizon and reaches the 1% level in model 4 which suggests that opacity is 
more likely to alter the predictive power of market variables for the longest horizons. In 
almost all cases (models 2, 3, 4) the coefficient of  LNP and the coefficient of the interacting 
indicator LNPxDOPAC are of opposite sign and significant.  Therefore a higher degree of 
opacity tends to weaken the existing link between market indicators and the probability of a 
future downgrade. Based on the results of  the  l + l' = 0  test, the predictive power of market 
indicators is totally outweighed by bank opacity, a result which holds for the 4 models and 
which is also confirmed by conducting the stepwise process on the sample of opaque banks 
showing (see table A3 in appendix) that none of our market indicators can predict downgrades 
                                                 
10 One can refer to Goyeau, Sauviat and Tarazi (2001) and Crouzille, Lepetit and Tarazi (2004) for a discussion 
on the use of these ratios as private information proxies.  
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for such banks. A similar result (see table A4 in appendix) is obtained when the dummy 
variable is constructed on the basis of the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets
12
. However, tests 
conducted with the subordinated debt ratio were not conclusive indicating that the predictive 
power of market variables is independent of the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks. 
 
 
Table 10 :  Contribution of market indicators and bank opacity  
Model specification : Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J L Li j ji l li l i li
j 1 l 1 l 1
' DOPAC C M ' DOPAC M             ) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONSTANT -2.720*** 
(-6.563) 
-1.454*** 
(-4.990) 
-1.185*** 
(-4.568) 
-0.612*** 
(-2.845)  
DOPAC -0.290 
(-0.519) 
-1.140** 
(-2.504) 
-1.085 *** 
(-2.669) 
-1.357*** 
(-3.844)  INTAP -1.978*** 
(-3.095)     ROE 
 
-0.080** 
(-2.523) 
-0.069** 
(-2.293) 
-0.054** 
(-2.212)  
LNP -5.074 * 
(-1.927) 
-4.74*** 
(-2.767) 
-5.426*** 
(-3.076) 
-5.596*** 
(-3.707)  
LNP DOPAC 4.026 
(1.266) 
4.798** 
(2.193) 
5.063** 
(2.258) 
5.970*** 
(2.899)  
Mc Fadden R2 0.127 0.150 0.149 0.177 
Total number of observations 187 204 213 237 
Number  of observations of type Y=1 15 29 38 62 
Risk level to reject  : α'= 0 et γl'=0 l 37.11 % 0.31%*** 0.17 %*** 0.00 %*** 
Risk level to reject : γl + γl' =0  l 56.49 % 96.83 % 79.51 % 79.01 % 
 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the 
accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Opacity effect is taken into account with a 
dummy variable (DOPAC) associated with the constant and the market indicators. DOPAC is equal to 1 if the 
value of the ratio market funded liabilities / total assets is lower than its median (25.63%), and 0 otherwise. 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models 
because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 See table A4 in appendix for results obtained with the ratio  Deposits / Total Assets. The other results are 
available from the authors upon request.   
12 This neutralization effect is in line with the results obtained by Billett, Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) who show 
that Moody’s downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns which are increasing in the bank’s 
reliance on insured deposits. To check for consistency, we tested for market reaction following a downgrade for 
two different samples of banks by regressing the dependent variable on LNP  (measured either on December 31st 
preceding the event or on December 31st following the event). The results show (see table A5 in appendix) that 
for banks weakly reliant on deposits the market significantly reacts only after the event.  For other banks, the 
market reacts both before and after the event but the reaction before the event is stronger (higher coefficients (in 
absolute value) and higher significance levels).   
 
 24
 
To check for robustness, the augmented models 1 to 4 were also estimated on 4 
different panels of banks on the basis of the structure of their balance sheets (table 11) to 
isolate the impact of marked to market assets and liabilities. Panel A consists of banks 
exhibiting a high degree of loan activity (low proportion of marked to market assets) weakly 
funded by insured deposits (high proportion of market funded liabilities); 2/ Panel B is limited 
to banks with a relatively high proportion of loans and weakly reliant on market debt; 3/ Panel 
C contains banks with a low loan activity funded to a large extent with insured deposits; 4/ 
Panel D is relative to banks with a low degree of loan activity mainly funded with market 
debt. More precisely, 2 criteria are taken into account to discriminate banks : the ratio of net 
loans to total assets (the extent to which assets are not marked to market) and the ratio of 
market funded liabilities to total assets (the extent to which a bank relies on insured and non 
marked to market liabilities).  The medians of both ratios were used to define the 4 panels 
(25.63% for the ratio of market funded liabilities and 54.32% for the loan ratio).  
Our main objective here is to assess the extent to which abundant market debt is likely to 
induce changes in the opacity of bank assets. In other words, does the predictive power of 
market indicators solely depend on the structure of bank liabilities (amount of market debt)? 
Are market participants (who should have strong incentives to discipline heavily market 
funded banks) able to process information when bank assets are, to a large extent, not market 
priced? The results in table 11 show that market indicators are powerful to predict future 
downgrades as long as the proportion of market debt in bank liabilities is relatively high, 
independently of the percentage of loans in bank assets (panels A and D). Moreover, when the 
proportion of (uninsured) market debt  is low (panels B and C) market indicators tend to loose 
their predictive power which confirms the results obtained in table 10. This result holds for 
any asset profile (proportion of loans) and thus for any degree of transparency of the asset 
side of the balance sheet.  
Moreover, this result is unchanged with respect to the amount of subordinated debt 
issued by banks : when banks are heavily reliant on insured and non market priced deposits, 
larger subordinated debt issues do not contribute to improve prediction (left hand side of table 
12, H0 : l = 0  l). Conversely, the results obtained in the right hand side of table 12 (H0 : l = 
0  l) show that larger subordinated debt issues significantly reinforce the role of market 
indicators when bank liabilities are to a large extent market based (low proportion of insured 
deposits in the balance sheet).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to assess the extent to which stock market prices can 
contribute to improve the prediction of future bank financial distress and thus to question the 
role and effectiveness of market discipline in the banking industry. By implementing a logit 
econometric model specifically designed for European banks we tested for the additional 
contribution of market based indicators (relatively to public financial statements) using a large 
set of accounting and stock market indicators. Whereas some of our results support the use of 
market related indicators (in line with those previously obtained in the literature), we show 
that the accuracy of the predictive power is dependent on the extent to which bank liabilities 
are market traded. For banks which heavily rely on (insured) deposits, the market seems 
unable to convey useful information and the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks 
does not contribute to any improvement in the expected link.   
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Table 11 : Degree of securitization of assets and liabilities and contribution of market indicators 
Model specification:  Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J Li j ji l li
j 1 l 1
C M       ) 
 
Panel A : (net loans/ total assets) high and 
(market funded liabilities/ total liabilities) high 
Panel B :  (net loans/ total assets) high and 
(market funded liabilities/ total liabilities) low 
Panel C : (net loans/ total assets) low and 
(market funded liabilities/ total liabilities) low 
Panel D : (net loans/ total assets) low and 
(market funded liabilities/ total liabilities) high 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
-3.169 
*** 
(-2.788) 
-2.097*** 
(-3.531) 
-1.629*** 
(-3.439) 
-0.688** 
(-1.986) 
-3.405***
(-4.777) 
-2.861*** 
(-5.175) 
-2.418*** 
(-5.445) 
-2.304***
(-5.399) 
-2.555*** 
(-4.408) 
-2.250*** 
(-4.430) 
-2.171*** 
(-4.197) 
-1.790***
(-4.354) 
-3.182*** 
(-4.682) 
-1.196*** 
(-3.168) 
-0.934 
*** 
(-2.826) 
-0.576* 
(-1.954) 
INTAP -2.717 
(-1.426) 
   
-1.787 
(-1.207) 
   
-0.989 
(-0.716) 
   
-3.382*** 
(-3.940) 
   
ROE  -0.061 
(-0.929) 
-0.027 
(-0.431) 
-0.049 
(-0.874) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.322) 
0.058 
(0.447) 
0.073 
(0.640) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.094) 
-0.046 
(-0.522) 
-0.004 
(-0.051) 
 
-0.097*** 
(-3.013) 
-0.091*** 
(-2.774) 
-0.076*** 
(-2.592) 
LNP 
-12.021** 
(-2.328) 
-9.004*** 
(-3.001) 
-7.559*** 
(-2.851) 
-6.424***
(-2.938) 
2.358 
(0.915) 
2.503 
(1.113) 
2.873 
(1.380) 
4.725* 
(1.905) 
-2.885 
(-1.251) 
-2.249 
(-1.297) 
-2.757 
(-1.514) 
-3.237* 
(-1.817) 
-4.720** 
(-2.330) 
-3.879* 
(-1.940) 
-5.139** 
(-2.230) 
-5.263** 
(-2.380) 
Mc Fadden 
R2 
0.234 0.193 0.140 0.157 0.043 0.018 0.021 0.054 0.034 0.018 0.049 0.033 0.318 0.191 0.205 0.183 
Total  
number of 
observations 
34 39 41 55 61 62 64 66 51 53 54 56 41 50 54 60 
Number of 
observations 
with  Y=1 
4 7 9 23 3 4 6 8 4 5 6 8 4 13 17 23 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Four sub-
samples are taken into account on the basis of two ratios ; net loans/ total assets and market funded liabilities/ total liabilities. These ratios are considered high if their value is higher than the 
median (25.63% for market funded liabilities/ total liabilities and 54.32% for net loans/ total assets). Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 
quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 12 : Structure of bank liabilities, subordinated debt and contribution of market 
indicators 
Model specification:  
Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J L Li j ji l li l i li
j 1 l 1 l 1
' DUMSUBA C M ' DUMSUBA M             ) 
 Test of  the null hypothesis of absence of  predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio 
subordinated debt/ total assets is lower than its median, H0 : l + l' = 0  l 
Test of  the null hypothesis of absence of  predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio 
subordinated debt/ total assets is higher than its median,  H0 : l  = 0  l 
 Sample with high ratio of deposits/ total assets Sample with low ratio of deposits/ total assets 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
-3.645*** 
(-3.258) 
-2.008*** 
(-3.843) 
-1.657*** 
(-3.654) 
-1.446*** 
(-3.391) 
-3.221 *** 
(-4.402) 
-2.811*** 
(-3.143) 
-2.279 *** 
(-3.445) 
-0.956** 
(-2.335) 
INTAP -1.194 
(-0.947) 
   
-2.962*** 
(-2.486) 
   
ROE  0.068 
(0.832) 
0.040 
(0.495) 
0.076 
(0.994) 
 
-0.101*** 
(-3.364) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.208) 
-0.075*** 
(-2.810) 
DUMSUBA 
0.607 
(0.543) 
-0.425 
(-0.655) 
-0.647 
(-1.096) 
-0.563 
(-1.015) 
-0.417 
(-0.411) 
1.586* 
(1.668) 
1.269* 
(1.709) 
0.444 
(0.862) 
LNP 
-1.285 
(-1.287) 
-2.639 
(-1.175) 
-3.669 
(-1.596) 
-3.160 
(-1.465) 
-4.578* 
(-1.787) 
-11.683*** 
(-3.027) 
-12.619***
(-3.439) 
-7.936*** 
(-2.972) 
LNP  
DUMSUBA 
2.859 
(0.782) 
2.536 
(0.749) 
4.657 
(1.363) 
4.604 
(1.282) 
-6.550 
(-1.585) 
7.103 
(1.608) 
7.868* 
(1.857) 
2.641 
(0.778) 
Mc Fadden 
R2 
0.029 0.020 0.032 0.033 0.330 0.265 0.241 0.196 
Total  number 
of 
observations 
106 111 114 118 73 80 85 104 
Number of 
observations 
with  Y=1 
5 10 13 17 10 17 22 41 
Risk level to 
reject : γl + γl' 
=0  l 65.34% 96.97 % 70.03 % 62.22% 0.08 %*** 4.12  %** 2.82 %** 0.53 %***
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the accounting 
indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Two sub-samples are taken into account depending on the value of 
the ratio deposits/ total assets. This ratio is considered high if it is higher than the median (67.57%). The dummy variable 
DUMSUBA associated with the constant and the market indicators is equal to 1 if the value of the ratio subordinated debt/ 
total assets is lower than its median (1.51%). Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 
1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The last line of the table gives the levels of risk 
to reject the null hypothesis of absence of predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio subordinated debt/ total 
assets is lower than 1.51%. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Table A1 
Financial deterioration and early indicators 
Simple regressions / closed windows 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Capital  
ΔKPCN 
0.142** 
(1.998) 
 
   
ΔKPD    - 0.163** 
(-2.097) 
FPA   0.542** 
(2.225) 
 
ΔCAPITAL   0.322** 
(2.340) 
0.248** 
(2.099) 
Asset quality  
ΔDOTREV  0.029** 
(2.379) 
  
DOTCB  1.494*** 
(2.963) 
  
DOTA  1.861** 
(2.312) 
  
INDIC   6.328** 
(2.303) 
 
Earnings 
 
ΔINTAM -1.672** 
(-2.015) 
   
ΔINTAP -1.746** 
(-2.605) 
   
ΔROA  -1.216** 
(-2.421) 
 
-0.795** 
(-2.061) 
ΔROE  -0.073** 
(-2.161) 
  
Liquidity ΔALREF -0.078** 
(-2.228) 
   
Market 
indicators 
EXCRCUM  
-3.340** 
(-1.986) 
 
-2.620** 
(-2.131) 
ECTYP   -52.724** 
(-2.502) 
 
LNP 
-3.230** 
(-2.089) 
-3.065** 
(-2.076) 
-3.854** 
(-2.386) 
-4.035** 
(-2.500) 
BETA   -1.163*** 
(-3.149) 
0.832** 
(1.987) 
RCUM    
-4.015** 
(-2.452) 
RCUM_NEG 
1.407** 
(2.524) 
  
0.975** 
(1.994) 
This table reports simple logit estimation results : for each model, the dependent variable is separately 
regressed on each explanatory variable and a constant. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings (whatever 
their extent) occurring respectively in the 1rst, 2nd, 3rd and 4rd quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the 
Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis. 
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Table A2 
 Is the predictive power of market indicators increasing when rating agencies agree on the 
opportunity of downgrading the same bank ? 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
 
-1.989 ***
(-8.094) 
-1.703*** 
(-7.944) 
-1.184*** 
(-6.882) 
Earnings ratios 
INTAP 
   
 ROE -0.068** 
(-2.086) 
-0.048 
(-1.485) 
-0.035* 
(-1.335)  
Market indicators 
LNP -2.686 ** 
(-2.051) 
-3.245** 
(-2.564) 
-3.814 *** 
(-3.440)  
LNP*CONSENSUS
-12.961 
(-0.924) 
-16.207 
(-1.100) 
-15.512 
(-1.056) 
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.118 0.120 0.110 
Number of observations 204 213 237 
Number of cases  Y=1 29 38 62 
 
CONSENSUS = 1 if, at least, one of the two other rating agencies downgraded the same bank in the four months 
following the first downgrade and 0 in any other cases. Model 1 could not be estimated ( insufficient number of 
observations).  
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 Table A3 
Contribution of market indicators and bank opacity 
Two Stages Stepwise  
Sample : banks weakly reliant on market debt  (ratio of market funded liabilities / total assets lower than its 
median (25.63%) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Constant 
-3.633*** 
(-6.259) 
-2.584*** 
(-5.904) 
-2.291*** 
(-6.780) 
-2.556*** 
(-5.554) 
Capital  
ΔKPCN 0.364** 
(2.497) 
   
ΔKPD  -0.300** 
(-2.266) 
-0.306** 
(-2.356) 
 
KPA    -1.519* 
(-1.813) 
 PROVA  2.943** 
(2.463) 
  
Asset Quality INDIC    8.388*** 
(2.762) 
Earnings  No One 
Liquidity ΔALREF -0.210*** 
(-3.327) 
   
Market 
Indicators 
 No One 
Mc Fadden 
R2 
 0.275 0.212 0.083 0.152 
Total Number 
of 
Observations 
 97 91 119 87 
Number of 
Observations 
of Type Y = 1 
 7 8 12 11 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed, in a first step, on a 
constant and the accounting indicators selected by the stepwise process. In a second step we tried to augment 
the models of the first step with a market indicator. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring  
respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, 
** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each 
year and each indicator. 
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Table A4 
 Contribution of market indicators and bank opacity  
Model specification : Prob{Yi = 1} = ( J L Li j ji l li l i li
j 1 l 1 l 1
' DOPAC C M ' DOPAC M             ) 
DOPAC = 1 if Deposits / Total Assets > Median (67.57 %) 
DOPAC = 0 if Deposits / Total Assets < Median 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONSTANT -2.496*** 
(-6.142) 
-1.159*** 
(-5.153) 
-1.318 
(-4.764) 
-0.704 
(-3.165)  
DOPAC -0.813 
(-1.361) 
-0.817* 
(-1.794) 
-0.813** 
(-1.979) 
-1.138*** 
(-3.227)  INTAP -1.881*** 
(-2.971)     ROE 
 
-0.075** 
(-2.435) 
-0.065** 
(-2.173) 
-0.048** 
(-1.991)  
LNP -5.323 
(-1.627) 
-5.567*** 
(-3.11) 
-6.298*** 
(-3.511) 
-6.152*** 
(-4.173)  
LNP DOPAC 5.339 
(1.458) 
5.187** 
(2.329) 
5.655** 
(2.570) 
6.055*** 
(3.011)  
Mc Fadden R2 0.154 0.137 0.140 0.165 
Total number of observations 187 204 213 237 
Number  of observations of type Y=1 15 29 38 62 
Risk level to reject  : α'= 0 et γl'=0 l 10.60 % 0.68 % 0.26 % 0.00 % 
Risk level to reject : γl + γl' =0  l 99.19 % 78.33 % 63.34 % 94.46 % 
This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the 
accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Opacity effect is taken into account with a 
dummy variable (DOPAC) associated with the constant and the market indicators. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain 
downgradings occurring  respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the 
Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not 
available for each bank, each year and each indicator. 
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Table A5 
Market reactions before and after a downgrade  
 for banks strongly/weakly reliant on deposits 
 
 
 
Market reaction preceding a downgrade 
Banks strongly reliant on deposits 
 
 Y (4 quarter 
horizon) 
Constant -1.716*** 
(-6.678) 
LNP -1.839 
(-1.178) 
Mc Fadden R2 0.013 
Total Number of Observations 121 
Number of Observations of 
Type Y = 1 
18 
 
 
Market reaction preceding a downgrade 
Banks weakly reliant on deposits 
 
 Y (4 quarter 
horizon) 
Constant -0.730*** 
(-3.504) 
LNP -5.125*** 
(-3.738) 
Mc Fadden R2 0.117 
Total Number of Observations 126 
Number of Observations of 
Type Y = 1 
45 
 
 
Market reaction following a downgrade 
Banks strongly reliant on deposits 
 
 Y (4 quarter 
horizon) 
Constant -1.955*** 
(-6.191) 
LNP(1) -4.157** 
(-2.047) 
Mc Fadden R2 0.058 
Total Number of Observations 104 
Number of Observations of 
Type Y = 1 
12 
 
Market reaction following a downgrade 
Banks weakly reliant on deposits 
 
 Y (4 quarter 
horizon) 
Constant -1.049*** 
(-4.249) 
LNP(1) -3.452** 
(-2.220) 
Mc Fadden R2 0.053 
Total Number of Observations 94 
Number of Observations of 
Type Y = 1 
26 
 
 
 
The two sub-samples are based on the median of Deposits / Total Assets (67.57 %). Tables report logit 
estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant and LNP which is the difference 
between the natural logarithm of the market price and its moving average evaluated on December 31st of the 
year preceding the event or LNP(1) which  is evaluated on December 31st following the event. Standard errors 
are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
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DISTANCE TO DEFAULT 
 
The distance to default indicator DD that is the number of standard deviations away from the 
default point (ie when the value of assets = the value of liabilities) is
13
 : 
 
 
T
Tr
D
V
DD
t
t
f
t
t
t 
   2log
2
 
where :  
Vt : bank's asset value at time t 
Dt : book value at time t of the bank's debt of maturity T 
T : debt maturity  
rf  : risk free interest rate 
σt : bank's asset value volatility 
  
To estimate Vt and σt the value of equity is considered as a call option on the underlying 
assets with a strike price equal to the book value of the bank's debt. Hence, the market value  
and volatility of the bank's underlying assets can be derived from the equity's market value 
(VE) and volatility (σE) by solving : 
)1(
)2(
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where :  
T
Tr
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d
t
t
f
t
t

   2log1
2
 
Tdd t 12  
 
Daily market values of the bank's equity (VE) are taken from Datastream. The volatility of the 
bank's equity (σE) is calculated on the quarter preceding the end of the calendar year (ie 65 
trading days) as the standard deviation of daily equity returns multiplied by 365 .  
The expiry date of the option (T) is in this case equal to the maturity of the debt. A common 
assumption is to set it to 1 (one year)
14
. We took the 12 months interbank rates from 
Datastream to compute risk free rates except for Greece where we used the 6 months 
interbank rate. Data on debt liabilities were taken from Bankscope. The total amount of 
liabilities is calculated as the total amount of deposits, money market funding, bonds, 
subordinated debt and hybrid capital. 
 
                                                 
13 For details see Crosbie (1999), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005). 
14 See Crosbie (1999), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005). 
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